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THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM IN
AGGREGATE LITIGATION
Samuel Issacharoff*
Recent developments in class action law and scholarship have forced
new attention on the question of how class representation should be
assessed. This Article begins with an examination of the governance
problem in class action analyzed from the perspective of the customary
political theories that would justify legitimate government in public and
private domains. Customary accounts of democratic legitimacy or
contractual voluntarism poorly capture the distinct world of the one-time
aggregation of a class under court-assigned leadership. What emerges is
an assessment of how various class action doctrines serve to fill the void in
customary indications of legitimacy in governance. The Article concludes
with a review of alternative efforts to structure class governance to avoid
the agency problems inherent in the power to manage the affairs of others.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal disputes over class actions operate at two distinct levels. The
immediate question before any court confronting an issue of class
certification is relatively straightforward: Should the class be certified or
not? In a contested certification for purposes of establishing liability, the
* Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law. I am
indebted to the research assistance of Rachel Goodwin, Maria Ponomarenko, and Samuel
Zeitlin.
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plaintiffs will be proponents, and the defendants will object for entirely
comprehensible reasons of self-interest. When class certification is sought
following settlement, plaintiffs and defendants embrace the putative class
action, and the objections arise from those outside the operative command
of the case.
Framed as a dispute over certification, class actions quickly descend into
a ritualized review of the applicable factors under Rule 23. Beginning at
least with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor1 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,2 the adequacy of class
representation became one of the most promising routes to challenge the
appropriateness of class certification. In contested class certification
proceedings, representational adequacy became a focus of litigation, joining
with the predominance question under Rule 23(b)(3) and, more recently in
the aftermath of Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes,3 the existence of common
issues under Rule 23(a)(2). For both defendants seeking to resist the
creation of a litigation class and for objectors challenging a proposed
settlement, the question of the “structural assurance of fair and adequate
representation,”4 as formulated in Amchem, became a central litigation
issue. And, in each setting, the objection to the stewardship of the class
became grounds to attack the viability of the aggregate proceeding.
Challenges to the adequacy of the representation are thus offered for
strategic reasons in the certification context. The case law offers a gambit
for opposition, and lawyers, unsurprisingly, frame their litigation aims in
the doctrinal language available. Nonetheless, the strategic context should
not obscure that assigning the right of representation to a binding class
resolution of a dispute is a serious question, independent of whether a
particular dispute should or should not proceed as a class. Put another way,
whether a dispute is proper for collective resolution is analytically distinct
from the question of what safeguards should be in place to ensure proper
representation.
In order to disentangle the case specific strategic challenges from the
underlying problem of leadership in representative actions, a return to a few
basics is required. A class action overcomes a host of collective action
problems, ranging from the inadequacy of individual claimants’ resources
to potential holdout problems and can secure a premium for complete
settlement with a defendant.5 Across decades of case law, the gains from
collective resolution of disputes are the defining feature of why there must
be aggregative procedures in the litigation arsenal. But the fact that an
action has the attributes of an aggregated claim does not by itself ensure
1. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
2. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
4. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627.
5. See generally D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122877.
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that it is properly led. Clearly someone has to be in charge. Who that
someone, and by what measure of selection and accountability remain vital
questions even after the need for collective resolution is established.
Tactical decisions made in the litigation context should not collapse the two
inquiries. It is perfectly possible to endorse the need for collective
proceedings in a variety of contexts, while full well realizing the agency
problems of faithless representatives.
This Article looks to pursue the distinct issue of how to overcome the
agency problem in class representation.
Two advances in recent
scholarship help frame this debate. The first is the concept of a class as an
“entity,” as formulated by David Shapiro, having a persona and character
distinct from its constituent class members, in the same fashion as we
assign a legal persona to a corporation distinct from its individual
shareholders.6 The second advance, following on central insights of both
private and public law, is to consider the governance structure of legally
created entities as a distinct problem drawing on basic concepts of
democratic theory and representation by agents.7
Isolating the governance issue puts to the side the questions of why there
need be aggregative structures. Regardless of whether the justification is
the negative value of most individual consumer claims, the judicial
efficiencies of common discovery, the indivisibility of claims for injunctive
relief, or the distribution of a limited corpus, the question of who is in
charge remains. When isolated as a question of who should govern, a
central concern in the class action case law comes into clearer resolution.
Separated from the justification for aggregate treatment, there are questions
of how the ruling group is selected, what the accountability mechanisms
toward the class members are, what the measures of proper performance in
office are, and what normative justification there is for that ability to make
decisions for an individual with whom there is no direct bond or agreement.
The modern class action cannot claim significant affirmative acts by class
members indicating their acceptance of the terms of representation.8 There
is no telling act by class members that would look like the realized buy-in
of the capital markets,9 or any other mechanism that would allow a clear
signal of consent to representation. Instead, class action law has to look for
substitutes for the legally constructed rights of representation.
6. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 917 (1998). For an overview of the role of this approach in the literature on class
actions, see Alexandra D. Lahav, Two Views of the Class Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1939
(2011).
7. Among the foundational pieces in this approach would be Samuel Issacharoff,
Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337.
8. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812–13 (1985) (describing the
limited requirements for class membership and the limited means of participation).
9. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 296 (2010) (“In the corporate governance context, an entrepreneur
seeking to raise capital for a business venture must convince investors to opt in and buy the
securities of the entrepreneur’s start-up corporation.”).
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Once so framed, the governance issues in class action law begin to
resemble many of the central debates in political theory concerning the
legitimacy of the ruling authority of the state. The comparison is
necessarily partial, but the thrust of this Article is to map some of the
critical questions of the appointment of class counsel onto broader debates
about political leadership. Simply put, the focus is on who should be the
head of the class.
To flesh out the analogy to governance problems a bit, we may consider
a class action (and to a lesser degree the powers of the multidistrict
litigation (MDL) leadership group) as a state-conferred monopoly of
representation. Viewed this way, the certification decision serves as a stateconferred subsidy to the representatives to overcome the collective action
costs of assembling the group.10 As with any state-conferred monopoly of
representation, there are immediate concerns about the democratic pedigree
of the institution. This is an issue that has dominated areas of law where
the institutions created by the state have longer life, as with trade unions or
corporations. In each, the duty of fair representation and the principles of
corporate governance are dominant parts of the law.11 Each is an attempt to
establish principles of accountability to the represented parties (union
members and shareholders) that combine rights guarantees (e.g., union
members’ bill of rights), periodic review of managerial performance
(corporate elections, Department of Labor supervision of union elections),
and strong assertions of fiduciary obligations. These in turn combine with
liability for breach of the fiduciary role (e.g., union duty of fair
representation, shareholder derivative suits, securities fraud liability).
Taken together, corporate and trade union accountability mechanisms try to
reproduce in these secondary sectors the characteristics of democratic
accountability in the primary governance structure of the state. There are
all sorts of arguments on whether some sort of Tieboutian12 sorting is more
available through market exit options in the corporate setting or through
labor mobility in the union setting. But at each stage we find an attempt to
recreate aspects of the basic governance paradigm.

10. This view of class actions is well presented in Judith Resnik, Money Matters:
Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in
Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2127–29 (2000).
11. See generally Archibald Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151
(1957) (presenting a history of the duties of trade union leaders); see also Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (describing the fiduciary duties of corporate directors).
12. The Tiebout model finds that, given exit mechanisms and complete information,
individuals’ movements between local governments will establish an equilibrium in which
each government’s size and provision of goods and services accurately reflects the aggregate
preferences of its residents. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956); see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 691 & n.29 (1984) (applying
the Tiebout model to corporate governance law); Charles K. Rowley, Toward a Political
Economy of British Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1135, 1149 (1984) (applying the Tiebout
model to trade unions).
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I. GOVERNANCE OUTSIDE POLITICS
There are no recognizable ordinary politics in the domain of class
actions. We do not find elections, political parties, limited terms of office,
formalized governance mechanisms, or an overriding constitutional
commitment to certain forms of liberty and equality, and the list goes on.
This alone seems fatal for any attempt to import elements of democratic
governance into contemporary mass litigation practice. It is of course true
that any aggregation of individuals raises questions of representative
integrity that in turn raise questions of institutional design that sound in
democratic principles. But the answers that suffice for democratic politics
do not easily translate to the litigation setting. In the more confined context
of litigation, there are no political parties, no clear rules of candidacy, and
no preexisting practices honed over generations of leadership selection.
And yet, it is worth pursuing what elements of democratic integrity can—
and cannot—be integrated into class action debates.
A. The Single Term
In the world of game theory, the key to stable results is repeat play.
Robert Axelrod’s famous examination of retaliation instructs that the
limited response of “tit-for-tat” is only possible among adversaries for
whom the ability to measure the proportionality of the reaction offers an
institutional barrier to devastating escalation.13 In democratic politics, the
corollary is the iteration offered by elections14: the chance for the losers of
today to become the winners of tomorrow. For democratic theorists such as
Adam Pzreworski and his collaborators, the very concept of a democracy is
unthinkable until a second election in which the ruling elite is displaced by
rivals.15 Nothing so defines a true democracy as the ability to “throw the
rascals out.”16 In turn, the hallmark of the governmental legitimacy of a
democratic government comes from the fact that the voting citizens
13. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27–54 (1984).
14. This is the heart of the idea that republican governance is “administered by persons
holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 255 (J. Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987). For example, one
standard account of democratic legitimacy centers on “public policies are made, on a
majority basis, by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections
which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under [general] conditions of
political freedom.” Jesse Choper, The Supreme Court and the Democratic Branches:
Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 811 (1974) (alteration in original)
(quoting H. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 70 (1960)).
15. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, MICHAEL E. ALVAREZ, JOSE ANTONIO CHEIBUB & FERNANDO
LIMONGI, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN
THE WORLD, 1950–1990, at 18–25 (2000).
16. The formulation that this is the nub of democracy is from G. BINGHAM POWELL JR.,
ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS
47 (2000). The underlying view holds that “the primary function of the electorate” in a
democracy is not only creating “a government (directly or through an intermediate body)”
but also “evicting it.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 272
(2d ed. 1975).
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returned it to office, a retrospective act of approbation. Without such an
after-the-fact ability to rethink leadership, it is hard to legitimate the right to
exercise power over and make binding decisions on others.
The central role of retrospective review in democratic theory poses an
immediate dilemma for the legitimacy of a governance structure in one-shot
enterprises, such as the creation of a class to litigate a defined event. Only
the rarest of cases will have such lasting power as to revisit the selected
leadership, and even those cases cannot be identified at the outset nor
subjected to meaningful periodic review. To the extent that accountability
theories of governmental legitimacy turn on the second chance to reject the
leadership, such an approach would pose daunting problems for the claims
of class actions to assign leadership responsibility to those dubbed
“adequate representatives.”17
A review of class action law and rules reforms over the past twenty years,
however, gives a mildly more optimistic account. To understand why, it is
necessary to step back a bit into democratic theory. The idea of
accountability as the centerpiece of democratic legitimacy was strongly
advanced by Joseph Schumpeter who rejected any claim that the fate of
democracy turned on either the aggregation of preexisting voter preferences
or the participatory deliberation of the populace. Rather, representative
democracy necessarily entailed a competition for office by political elites,
who would in turn educate, cajole, and entice the citizens to vote for them.
As Schumpeter defined the task, “the democratic method is that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire
the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s
vote.”18
Thus, the problem of class governance can be thought of as one of
democratic legitimacy in the absence of a robust capacity for retrospective
endorsement of the decisions taken by the agent elites, as in mature political
democracies. On some accounts, like Martin Redish’s,19 this simply dooms
the enterprise and violates the due process requirements of constitutional
legitimacy—an overly simplistic account of due process, political
legitimacy, and the myriad institutional arrangements that exist in the
modern administrative state. Yet the challenge persists. By what theory of
governance-based legitimacy can the modern class action be justified?20
17. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J.
371, 379–81 (2001) (highlighting the role of adequacy of representation in leading Supreme
Court cases on mass harm class actions).
18. SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, at 269.
19. See generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE:
CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009). For a rejoinder
focusing on the nuanced forms of accountability found in democratic governance, see
Alexandra H. Lahav, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2011).
20. This argument can be extended as well to the domain of the leadership of the
plaintiffs’ steering committee in multidistrict litigation proceedings. See Charles Silver &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations:
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010). For present purposes, it is
sufficient to focus primarily on the formal mechanisms of class actions.
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We can return to the basic insight about political competition in
democracy. While most attention is rightfully directed toward the
importance of competition in creating the capacity for rotation in office, that
competition not only ensured accountability but gave an incentive to
political elites to draw the citizens into the process. The Schumpetarian
account of democracy shares more than a passing resemblance to the
negative value claims amassed in class actions, and to the ensuing “rational
apathy” of the ordinary participants to expend huge effort to monitor
developments.21 Here, per Schumpeter, there is no escaping the brute fact
that “collectives act almost exclusively by accepting leadership.”22 But
competition produces an antidote to the fact that the masses of the
population typically have little interest in the day-to-day affairs of
governance. Information is costly and a distraction from overly busy lives.
What keeps democracy going is the need of the engaged elites to attempt to
secure ongoing support in periodic elections. They must compete for the
approbation of the masses, and to do so requires them to educate, cajole,
engage, etc., in the rough and tumble of politics—the pull, trade, and haul
to which even the Supreme Court has appealed.23
Retrospective approval serves not only to engage the masses of
democratic voters but also to provide the easy organizing principle for
assessing the stewardship of elites. When the question is asked about the
effectiveness of the prior governors seeking to renew their mandate (e.g.,
“Are you better off than you were four years ago?”), basic measures—such
as the state of the economy, foreign military engagements, security, party
affiliation—can provide easy organizing cues for voter decision making,
even in the limited period of engagement leading to an election.
A class action by its nature cannot produce rotation in office. Perhaps,
however, it can imperfectly recreate some incentives for leadership to
engage the absent and generally indifferent class members. One small
manifestation comes with the question of the basis for fees for class counsel
in a settlement. An older line of cases made the common benefit
denominator turn on the potentially available benefit to the class.24 Class
counsel’s responsibility ended with the fairness hearing approval of the
settlement, with no subsequent requirement that the class’s capacity for
recovery be engaged. The sole determinant of the appropriateness of what
the class leadership had obtained would be the judge’s assessment of the
result. Passive class members, whose limited stake made direct control of
the litigation unavailing, would be left out of the process as much in the
settlement stage as in the litigation process.

21. Jack Coffee coined this phrase regarding the little reason that most class members
had to pay much attention to the activities of class counsel. Coffee, supra note 9, at 305.
22. SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, at 270.
23. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
24. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 473 (1980) (“[A] proportionate share
of the fees awarded to lawyers who represented the successful class may be assessed against
the unclaimed portion of the fund created by a judgment.”).
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The lack of responsiveness to the class after settlement led to concern
over practices such as coupon settlements in which the face value of the
settlement could vary markedly from the actual results for the class. At one
level, this is just a question of agency costs resulting from the separation of
incentives between lawyers and clients. This prompted legislative rejection
of compensating lawyers on the face value of a settlement, regardless of the
take-up rate of the benefits by class members. Instead, under the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA), fees must be based on the realized benefits
for the class.25 Similarly, the corresponding proposal by the American Law
Institute’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation (ALI Principles) mandates
that “[a]ttorneys’ fees in class actions . . . should be based on . . . the actual
value of the judgment or settlement to the class . . . .”26
As a first-cut matter of governmental legitimacy, the need to engage
constituents in order for representative agents to get paid is a fairly poor
second-order approximation of democratic engagement. This should raise
alarm about the attempt to justify class action supervision in any terms
sounding in democratic theory. But it also offers an invitation to buttress
this partial (perhaps very partial) defense with other indicators of properly
functioning representative governance.
B. Voice and the Epistemic Moment
A long tradition in collective governance posits that the wisdom of the
multitude supercedes the capacity of lone decision makers. Whether
dressed up as modern Condorcetian theories, drawn from Aristotle,27 or
more popularly as the wisdom of crowds,28 many heads lead to truth with
surprising regularity. The desire to harness collective wisdom underlies
participatory theories of democracy and their justification in theories of
epistemic proceduralism.29
As with retrospective judgments, there is no clear approximation in class
action law for the capacity of political communities to deliberate, either
directly in the Athenian or New England town meeting sense, or indirectly
through ongoing debate in a Senate-style institution. There are early
indications of attempts to harness new media to allow greater participatory
deliberation in the class action arena.30 But in the typical consumer class
25. See Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711–1715 (2006).
26. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.13 (2010).
27. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS AND POETICS 74 (Benjamin Jowett & Thomas Twining
trans., Viking Press 1957) (“The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than
the few best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to
contain an element of truth.”).
28. JAMES SUROWEICKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 11 (2004).
29. See David M. Estlund, Who’s Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the
Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1437 (1993).
30. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 506, 509 (2011) (“[P]rocess should foster opportunities for plaintiffs in the
aggregate to form groups and to play a significant role in group governance [by] allowing
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action or in any case where rational indifference is likely to take hold, the
direct mechanisms of participatory engagement are not soon to be realized.
Viewed as an opportunity for deliberative engagement, some aspects of
class action practice emerge as helping to fill the governance legitimacy
gap. The laundry list factors employed by every circuit court to gauge the
propriety of a class action settlement invariably point centrally to the
approval of class representatives and class members in the results of the
litigation.31 The two key avenues of participation are the fairness hearing
and the right of appeal, as liberalized in Devlin v. Scardelletti.32 The
Federal Rules require a public hearing, open to class members, for any
proposal to settle a class action—the overwhelming form of resolution of
any case in which a class is certified. The same conditions of incentivized
indifference may obtain, but at least there is a public forum in which
dissident views may be engaged. Similarly, appeals provide a secondary
forum for dissident voices. Although there are reasons to suspect that the
effectiveness of such voices may be limited, courts nonetheless insist that at
least the opportunity to be heard serves as a touchstone for representational
legitimacy: “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard.”33
In practice, the power to object at a fairness hearing and the liberalized
ability to appeal are poor mechanisms for actual class member
engagement.34 Most often, they are an opportunity for either strategic
objectors or the socially marginalized to command a forum for ulterior
purposes. These practices are ill-suited to any epistemic search for superior
outcomes, but they provide a minor democratic moment for constituent
input. At the very least, they are a means of providing an additional
capacity to monitor agents in the class setting,35 and they do provide a very

plaintiffs to engineer and implement their own intraclaimant governance procedures . . . .”);
Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 451, 455 (2012).
31. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) (listing factor
number two, “the reaction of the class to the settlement”); see also Reed v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) (listing factor number six, “the opinions of the class
counsel, class representatives, and absent class members”); In re Am. Bank Note
Holographics, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 418, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“It is well settled that the
reaction of the class to the settlement is perhaps the most significant factor to be weighed in
considering its adequacy.” (citation omitted)).
32. 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
33. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (quoting Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
34. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2007) (“For individual class members,
objecting does not appear to be cost-beneficial. Objecting entails costs, and the stakes for
individual class members are often low. Indeed, objecting is unlikely to confer any benefit
on class members because judges routinely approve proposed settlements over the objections
of class members.”).
35. Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 571, 573 (1997) (“[A] class member must be allowed to intervene as a full party in a
proceeding that will extinguish her claim. Affording class members such a right of

3174

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

rough calculus of the consent of the absent and generally passive class
members to the results of representation.36 But as with any collective
undertaking, the mere fact that there are some objections can neither doom
the enterprise nor prevent the class resolution from being deemed
legitimate.37
Notably, however, the right of participation is directed not at the
collective process of group decision making but at the court, the arbiter of
outcomes more than process as such. Whereas democratic theory pays
tremendous attention to electoral rules and the process for collective action
in the political arena,38 the elaborate processes of political organization and
reorganization cannot exist in the more limited litigation enterprise.
Democratic legitimacy turns heavily on process values, something that is
only partially available as a defense of the class action. As a result, the
participatory aim in class actions is directed heavily to the mandating judge,
a figure who neither is the product of democratic selection among the
litigants nor can be replaced at the will of the constituents. Voice in the
class action setting is first and foremost about the merits of the results. In
the somewhat circular reasoning of the Eighth Circuit: “The adequacy of
class representation, however, is ultimately determined by the settlement
itself.”39
In the formal tests for approval of class action settlements, for example,
the right of participation is invariably coupled with the ultimate benefits
achieved through the resolution of the case.40 Courts have recognized that
the closure afforded by class settlements results in a “peace premium,”

intervention will not render class litigation unmanageable, but rather has the potential to
significantly improve the quality of representation afforded even to absent class members.”).
36. Mark C. Weber, A Consent-Based Approach to Class Action Settlement: Improving
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1155, 1193 (1998) (arguing for more
robust provisions for individual consent to class action settlement).
37. Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 370 (“[I]t cannot be that the failure of individual consent
must terminate a class action or prevent a settlement from being approved. Such an
approach would run counter to the premise of a class action as being able to discipline an
inherently unruly body that is incapable of generating sufficient individual protections
through consensual means.”).
38. This is also discussed at length in another work dealing with the political arena
proper. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan Lockups
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998).
39. White v. Nat’l Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994).
40. In re Prudential Ins. Co Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 323
(3d Cir. 1998) (factors include the existence and probable outcome of claims by other classes
and subclasses and the comparison between the results achieved by the settlement for
individual class or subclass members and the results achieved—or likely to be achieved—for
other claimants); Reed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1983) (listing
factors number four, “the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the merits”; and five, “the
range of possible recovery”); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir.
1974) (listing factors number eight, “the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in
light of the best possible recovery”; and nine, the range of reasonableness of the settlement
fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation).
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improving the collective welfare compared to what individuals might obtain
on their own behalf.41
As with the other efforts to map class leadership onto principles of
political legitimacy, the claim to rest the propriety of representation on
added value of the underlying legal claims is partial, at best. All forms of
government ultimately rest on the ability to return benefits to the governed.
Theories of democratic legitimacy generally leave the ultimate outcome
measures to the citizens themselves to judge through the exercise of their
collective decision making. The lack of individual ability or interest to
control class members’ individual destiny—as reflected in Rule
23(b)(3)(A)—forces class action law to turn to a non–process based
assessment of the merits of the resolution in its place. As with the other
approximations of democratic legitimacy in the class context, the forced
melding of the process values with the assessment of the benefits of the
collective undertaking weakens each strand—inevitable as this fusion of the
two might be.
C. The Right To Exit
Democracy is ultimately a selection procedure for governance of the
polity. Perhaps as a result, democratic theory poorly addresses the question
of who should be in the polity, or who belongs outside. We can fill in the
gaps with concepts of Tieboutian sorting at the local level. Thus, for
example, Charles Tilly posits that the ease of migration between European
states proved to be an antidote to government predation over the long
term.42 But while individuals may exit on occasion, there is no guaranteed
right of secession that serves as a formal check to the exercise of state
authority. Democracies cannot offer a unilateral right of exit in the form of
secession. Thus, when confronted with the question whether democratic
legal orders mandate that Quebec be given the right to secede, the Canadian
Supreme Court wrote:
The Court in this Reference is required to consider whether Quebec has a
right to unilateral secession. Arguments in support of the existence of
such a right were primarily based on the principle of democracy.
Democracy, however, means more than simple majority rule . . . . The
Constitution vouchsafes order and stability, and accordingly secession of
a province “under the Constitution” could not be achieved unilaterally,
that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in
Confederation within the existing constitutional framework.43

41. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J.,
concurring) (“A defendant, therefore, may be motivated to pay class members a premium
and achieve a global settlement in order to avoid additional lawsuits . . . .”); Rave, supra note
5 (manuscript at 9–10).
42. See generally CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD
990–1990 (1990).
43. In re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 220 (Can.).
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Or, more pithily, “[i]nternational law contains neither a right of unilateral
secession nor the explicit denial of such a right . . . .”44
In order for a democratic state to function, it must be capable of
intertemporal trade-offs. Just as political rotation in office offers the losers
of today the prospects of becoming part of a victorious coalition tomorrow,
so too does the long-term allow for the exercise of governmental powers.
The ability to tax and spend means that there is a constant readjustment of
the burdens and benefits of inclusion within the state. But without the
promise of the long run improvement, no sectors of the society would
accept a tax burden that predictably benefits distant projects or responds to
nonlocal emergencies. And, while the benefits of being locked in to this
exchange remain, so does the problem of how to construct the polity.45
By contrast, class action law guarantees not just voice, but the right of
exit—following Hirschman’s typology for individuals within institutions.
Indeed such an exit option stands as a centerpiece of the ability to bind
absent parties in personam to the results of a class judgment: “due process
requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an
opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an
‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the court.”46 In this sense, class
action law seems more solicitous of an individual option than does
democratic society more broadly. Indeed, the offer of a second option to
opt out of a class action from the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, endorsed
heartily by the ALI Principles, reinforces the importance of the exit option
in constructing the class action collective.47
The contrast with political leadership is instructive. To return to
Hirschman’s typologies of the relation between the individual and the
group, the importance of the exit option exists in relation with the other
forms of addressing agency cost in representative groups. Even accepting
that there are forms of Tieboutian sorting evident in residential patterns, the
costs of relocation include loss of community, separation from family and
friends, and other institutional affiliations through churches or civil society
organizations. At the same time, class actions typically do not have a
preexisting organizational form, and the exit option is far less costly.
Exit is a weak but real form of disciplining the agency risk inherent in
class representation. In the first instance, exit diminishes the rewards from
representation, especially for class counsel.48 More significantly, the
44. Id. at 277.
45. This problem is elaborated in Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy and Collective
Decisionmaking, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 231 (2008).
46. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
47. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.11 (2010).
48. Coffee, supra note 9, at 309 (arguing that “exit may be the more powerful tool in
litigation governance . . . . In the litigation context, when class members opt out, they
thereby reduce the total number of claims aggregated in the class action and hence the
settlement value of the case. Because fee awards are a function of settlement size, this in
turn reduces the likely fee award to class counsel.”). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and
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exercise of the exit option through significant opt outs signals to reviewing
courts the poor performance of the class representatives,49 even if the
overall absence of massive opt outs should dictate some caution in relying
too much on this one factor.50
D. Intermediaries
In contrast to democratic theory, once again, class action law turns to
outside intervention to check the powers of representation. There is no
ultimate measure of approbation from the represented that can form a
purely consensual basis for the delegation of power. The fact that the
ultimate form of selection is left to the power of another—in this case, the
court—means that process-based accounts of representational selection
must necessarily be incomplete. This inescapable “democracy deficit” is
only partially cured by the power to exit. Somehow this gap needs filling
and the primary mechanism to fill the gap is to search for agents to monitor
the representative agents, in effect “superagents.”51 Three strategies
emerge.
First, class actions only come into existence by the judicial act of
certification. Because the courts formalize the representational relationship,
it is possible to impose on the courts themselves a duty to serve as
fiduciaries for the act of bringing the class into being.52 Class actions
routinely, though loosely, invoke the concept of fiduciary obligations to
describe the role of class counsel and the courts in addressing the
vulnerabilities of absent class members to predation.53 Because class
actions are state-created relations designed to protect the welfare of the
class members, there is logic to bringing them within the broad ambit of the
law of fiduciary obligations.54 In its most prominent judicial exposition,
Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1560 (2004) (noting the low rate of objection in
class action litigation, suggesting that “class members do not highly value these rights that
courts and commentators have so widely praised as essential to the justification for group
litigation involving absent parties.”).
49. See id. at 1536 (“If bad representation triggers opt-outs and objections, counsel will
make an effort to provide good representation ex ante in order to prevent their deficiencies
from being brought to the attention of the court ex post.”).
50. See id. at 1562 (“The low level of opt-outs and objections also suggests that these
procedures do not provide a reliable means for ensuring that class members receive adequate
representation from competent and nonconflicted counsel and class representatives.”).
51. This term was first used in Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing
Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
52. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,
785 (3d Cir. 1995).
53. Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 997–98 (2012).
54. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1649, 1707–08 (2008); Eran B. Taussig, Broadening the Scope of Judicial
Gatekeeping: Adopting the Good Faith Doctrine in Class Action Proceedings, 83 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1275, 1330–33 (2009); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory
of Shareholder Representative Suits and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation,
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1768 (2012); Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword: Class
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Judge Posner asserted quite categorically that a court must serve as “a
fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high duty of care that
the law requires of fiduciaries.”55 In turn, the idea of courts serving as
fiduciaries underlies arguments for the importance of collateral challenge in
class settlements.56
The concept of courts as fiduciaries in group litigation follows from the
essence of aggregated claims, in any form. The greater the aggregation, the
more tenuous the link between principal and agent, and the greater the
potential for opportunistic behavior and the associated agency costs. Of
recent vintage is the effort to impose this duty beyond the formal act of
class certification. As articulated by Judge Jack Weinstein in developing
the concept of the fiduciary obligations of courts in the so-named “quasi–
class actions”:
The large number of plaintiffs subject to the same settlement matrix
approved by the court, the utilization of special masters appointed by the
court to control discovery and to assist in reaching and administering a
settlement, the court’s order approving and controlling a huge escrow
fund, other interventions by the court in controlling discovery for all
claimants, the employment of a multidistrict reference, and cooperation
among many federal and state courts, reflect a degree of court control that
supports the imposition of fiduciary standards to ensure fair treatment to
all parties and counsel . . . .57

The same logic yields to the imposition of mandatory duties to protect “the
rights and dignity of an otherwise depersonalized mass of
plaintiffs/claimants.”58 While the effectiveness of such broad fiduciary
principles is subject to ongoing debate,59 the need to fill the agency void is
well established.
Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action
Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1062–67 (2004) (detailing the elements of judicial
fiduciary scrutiny).
55. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted); see also In re Gen. Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 805 (noting the “fiduciary
responsibility” of the court in class-settlement review).
56. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against
Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148 (1998); Alan B. Morrison, The
Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Brief Reply to Professors Kahan
and Silberman, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1179 (1998). For the original article, see Marcel Kahan &
Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class Actions: A Critique of
Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 782 (1998) (“[T]he collateral attack remedy
created by Matsushita II is disproportional to the more general problem absent class
members face in monitoring the conduct of class counsel. The problem, in our view, is best
addressed by a careful review of the adequacy of representation in [the original forum],
before a settlement is approved.”).
57. In re Zyprexa, 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563–64 (E.D. La. 2009); In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *6
(D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).
58. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Essentials of Democratic Mass Litigation, 45 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 499, 521 (2012).
59. See generally Silver & Miller, supra note 20.
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Second, it is possible to deputize outsiders to the litigation to serve as
overseers.60 This is the approach taken, in part, by CAFA, which sought to
alter the incentives facing lawyers in large, aggregated cases across a
variety of axes.61 Among CAFA’s innovations was a requirement of notice
to the state attorneys general of consumer class actions involving citizens of
At least in theory, engaging the public
their respective states.62
representatives to monitor the conduct of the private attorneys general may
discipline the misbehavior of the self-nominated guardians of class
interests, at least in highly visible or particularly egregious instances.
A third approach is to formalize the role of a powerful intermediary with
a sufficient incentive to monitor the real agent in all representative
actions—class counsel. The leading example is the formalization of the
lead plaintiff role under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995. Under the “most adequate plaintiff” requirement, the forum court
“shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported
plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately
representing the interests of class members.”63 As envisioned, the lead
plaintiff’s self-interest is sufficiently great as to allow other class members
a free-ride on the ensuing monitoring function:
The lead plaintiff provision was adopted to encourage a class member
with a large financial stake to become the class representative. Congress
expected that such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a
securities fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that
may arise when class counsel’s interests diverge from those of the
shareholder class.64

All three of these approaches may be beneficial in certain contexts, or
may be an invitation to meddling by yet other sets of agents with other
agendas. Each of these approaches faces difficulties born of improperly
aligned incentives: judges may wish to clear their dockets; attorneys
60. Kahan & Silberman, supra note 56, at 778 (“One way to reduce undervaluation of
class members’ claims would be to strengthen the ‘monitoring’ of class counsel by obtaining
more effective monitors than ordinary class members, such as state attorneys general, who
would be given notice and have the authority to intervene in order to protect the interests of
absent class members in nationwide class actions.”).
61. Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1593, 1606–26 (2008) (discussing CAFA).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006). For an overview of the limited effectiveness of this
monitoring device, see generally Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision:
Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
64. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1688
(2006); see also id. at 1601 (“Such a heavy hitter is more likely to overcome the personal
interests of class counsel who may prefer the certainty of settling the suit quickly for a
smaller amount to investing more of the law firm’s resources in pursuing a larger settlement
that does not yield a proportional increase in counsel fees.”). But see Jill E. Fisch, Class
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 534 (1997)
(questioning “the ability of a lead plaintiff provision or other similar procedural reforms to
effect a meaningful change in the control of class action litigation”).
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general may be passive or may see the rewards of a class action settlement
as an opportunity for political gain; lead plaintiffs may seek different
returns on their investment than smaller players.65 Ultimately, one should
be cautious of inviting class members to stake their interests on the strategy
outlined by Blanche DuBois: “I have always depended on the kindness of
strangers.”66
E. Rivals for Leadership
The attempts to find greater and more actionable fiduciary duties bear a
marked resemblance to a corresponding trend in corporate law to close the
agency gap through fiduciary obligations. Entire generations of students of
corporate law were groomed on the decisions of the Delaware courts
defining the obligations of officers and directors of publicly traded
corporations to the diffuse and atomized shareholders—the class members
of the limited liability enterprise as it were. Beginning with trends in
scholarship and case law in the 1980s, however, corporate law turned to a
new source of restraint on potential agency costs. As with any market in
which built-in barriers to entry allow misconduct, one potential antidote is
renewed competition. In corporate law this takes the form of challenging
poison pills and other barriers to a market for corporate control.
Unsurprisingly, a similar impulse can be found in the market for class
action governance.67
One market import is the effort to auction the rights to class action
leadership, presumably to the lowest bidder in terms of class counsel fees.68
The arguments over the application of auction principles have been
rehearsed at length and need not be repeated here. There are problems in
measuring the low bid and the return to the class when higher priced
counsel might deliver a higher quality return69—even at a higher
percentage—and when a low bid might actually signal lawyers with little

65. Fisch, supra note 64, at 556–57.
66. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE 142 (SIGNET 1975) (1947).
67. Coffee, supra note 9, at 318 (arguing that participatory reforms “have less impact
than anticipated because they fail to encourage competition among counsel”).
68. Judge Vaughn Walker introduced the auction as a means of selecting class counsel
in In re Oracle Secs. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. 1990). The initial academic
proposal comes from Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations
for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105–16 (1991). For a summary of these efforts to reform
class counsel selection, see Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the
Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (2002); Rhonda
Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 497 (2000).
69. A prominent example comes with the bidding for leadership in the Auction House
antitrust litigation. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
see also DAVID BOIES, COURTING JUSTICE 320–54 (2004) (discussing the litigation over
price-fixing by the major auction houses). For a critical account of this litigation, see Alon
Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Counsel,
22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 69 (2004).
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interest in investing in the litigation and preferring a quick, cheap
settlement that maximizes short-term recovery of counsel.
Unfortunately, consideration of competition for leadership returns us to
the initial problem of a lack of repeat play. Without repeat play, and
without a clearly identifiable system of valuation, the attempt to use price
and other proxies for performance are inherently limited. Politics allows
the governed to select not only who their leaders shall be, but the criteria for
such decision making. Competition for the role of class counsel still leaves
the decision to an outside party and to one who is obligated to determine the
conditions of the competition for leadership.
II. AGENTS WITHOUT AGENCY COSTS?
The basic analogy to problems of public governance could be extended
and could encompass trends in other intermediary institutions of our
society. Increasingly, obligations sounding in democratic theory extend not
only to the quasi-public domain but to more private institutions directly.70
Public conceptions of democratic legitimacy spread from the imposition of
nominating primaries on political parties to the chartering requirements for
charitable institutions. All intermediary institutions in our society live to
some extent by grace of state licensing. This may take the form of tax
deductions for contributions to charitable organizations, tax exemption for
the land holdings of religious or educational institutions, or the ability of a
corporate entity to acquire the legal personhood necessary in order to
pledge assets as a bond for economic activity or to enter into legally binding
contracts.
In all intermediary institutions there is a misfit between democratic
theory and the exclusivity of the state-conferred capacity to act.
Intermediary institutions are closed by necessity in order to limit
participation to those who share the basic aims or activities of the
enterprise. This means that they must be able to restrict rights of
participation to those who are inside and exclude others from internal
deliberations. While these institutions exist in some sense by grace of
recognition and benefits derived from the body politic, they must
nonetheless function on a different basis than the overall democratic lines of
demarcation of the broader society. The paradox of civil society
institutions in a democracy is that their independence shores up democracy
as against the state, yet they cannot be held to the full democratic standards
demanded for political governance. Civil society institutions function “by
cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster
diversity and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of
the State.”71
70. Once again I must confess to drawing on ideas that I developed responding to a
distinct set of problems in the domain of public governance. See Samuel Issacharoff, Private
Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan
Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274 (2001).
71. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618–19 (1984).
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Class actions serve functionally as a short-lived, single-purpose civil
society institution. In prior writings I have drawn the analogy to the
Venetian grant of legal status to the commenda, “a rudimentary type of joint
stock company, which formed only for the duration of a single trading
mission.”72 As described by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, the
flexibility of a circumscribed venture unleashed tremendous entrepreneurial
spirit for the emergent Venetian Republic of the early Renaissance.73 The
entrepreneurial class action is the enforcement equivalent to the commenda,
an alternative to direct state regulation and to the state monopoly of
enforcement power. The state confers the exclusive legal personhood to the
class and awards exclusive rights of monopoly of representation granted to
the designated agents for the entity, in this case, class counsel. This
establishes the purpose for the state conferral of the power of class counsel
to act as agents for the usually passive absent class members.
But, as the foregoing section described, this new entity fails to meet the
standards for democratic legitimacy in critical domains, most notably in the
ability of the represented class members to express meaningfully their
approval or disapproval through retrospective review. This alone is not
surprising as intermediary institutions cannot be held to the full standards
operating in the public domain. At the heart of the difficulty is that a
litigation class is a short-lived institution, so the Schumpeterian
accountability paradigm does not work. Further, there are generally
massive transaction problems with even putatively engaging the
participants, so that surveying the class, elections, and periodic review are
all not often meaningfully available.
A. Transcending Private Agent Incentives
Thus far, this Article has suggested that many of the doctrines that have
emerged in class action law, and in secondary accounts such as the ALI
approach, are an attempt to fill this gap in democratic accountability. In the
absence of a more Schumpetarian account of periodic accountability and a
robust ability to “throw the bums out,” we can chronicle the institutional
substitutes that emerge as an effort to bridge this representational gap. The
various requirements for class certification try to temper the incentives of
the agent, who is necessarily imperfect as principal-agent tensions can only
be tamed, not eliminated. Moreover, they attempt to create mechanisms of
outside monitoring (e.g., the judge as fiduciary), examine the justificatory
necessity for litigation (an increase in anticipated joint welfare), and
consider the absence of realistic alternatives (the Churchillian defense of
democracy as worst of all systems except for all others). Finally, they aim
to protect some measure of active choice among the represented class

72. DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 152 (2012).
73. Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 385
(2012).
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members (e.g., right to opt out, second opt out), weigh the results obtained
(akin to the epistemological defense of democracy as likelier to lead to
superior outcomes), and no doubt attain quite a few other goals. At best,
these are all checkpoints for the state conferral of representational authority
in the absence of a conventional political accountability. Recognizing this
helps understand the fits and starts of much of the highly disputed law of
the past two decades, particularly the post-Amchem/Ortiz focus on the
nature of the representation as the key to proper class action practice.
Where does the governance insight lead? As I mentioned at the outset,
there is a tension in the case law in this regard because the question of
legitimate governance is almost always raised strategically. Challenges to
the adequacy of representation are usually part of the arsenal deployed by
defendants to oppose class certification or by objectors seeking either to
capture some of the compensatory prospects of a class action settlement or
to be able to pursue claims independently in other fora. Isolating who
should be in charge of a class action from the reasons for having a class
action helps (hopefully) to bring into sharper relief the reasoning behind the
case law and the evolved practices on class representation.
Even isolated in this fashion, the issue of the legitimacy of class
representation returns as part of the general concern for the extent of agency
cost associated with class counsel. Beginning with the hugely influential
writings of Professor Coffee twenty-five years ago,74 and continuing
through the Court’s decision in Amchem, many of the governance
mechanisms are directed to the prospect of agents acting in self-regarding
means. What follows from this, however, should not be a rejection of the
need for representative actions altogether, but greater attention to the
management and diminution of agency cost in class representation.
With all the pressures on legitimacy of representation come questions
about the possibility of alternative forms of representation. The search for
political legitimacy in class representation, at least in the contemporary
American class action, runs up directly against the entrepreneurial
motivation that the class action seeks to harness on behalf of the absent
class members. Presumably class counsel selected on the basis of an
economic commitment to maximize financial returns to the class will be
especially likely to succumb to the cross-cutting incentives in any principalagent relationship.
Perhaps it is possible to consider a form of representation that does not
involve these agency costs. At least in theory, it is possible to imagine that
class counsel can be selected based on other attributes, such as social
reputation, ideological commitments to the welfare of some groups, or even
evidence of saintliness. Selecting class representatives on this basis may
74. The articles begin with John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986), and John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation
of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987).
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substitute for the necessarily imperfect alignment of economic interests in
the American class action. Many foreign experiments with class actions try
to limit the pull of entrepreneurialism by substituting state officials or
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for the self-selection of the private
attorney general.75
Some commentators76 posit that it may be possible to avoid the agency
costs of the American entrepreneurial class actions by having consumer
organizations or social movements lead opt in groups of claimants. There
are limited examples of class action in the United States organized on an
opt in basis, or more significantly, led by public interest groups committed
to issues such as civil rights or environmental protection. While such
ideologically committed groups are unlikely to be motivated by the
narrower kinds of financial returns that fuel more entrepreneurial private
enforcement, representation always introduces a distance between the
interests of the principals and the decision making of the agents.77 The
extensive public economy literature on nonprofits finds that there are often
significant agency costs created not by the profit motive of for-profit
enterprises, but by the diffuse nature of the missions they seek to achieve
and the difficulties of monitoring their performance in the absence of
market-based returns.78 Further, the need for funding often compromises
the effectiveness of nonprofits to take on controversial issues or lead

75. For critical assessments, see Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2009) (reviewing European
class action reforms and considering their efforts to promote representative actions without
private lawyer initiatives); Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic
and the Future of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (reviewing
European efforts “to embrace civil procedure reforms to authorize aggregate litigation”).
For a critical account of the development of mass litigation in South America, focusing on
Argentina, see RICARDO LUIS LORENZETTI, JUSTICIA COLECTIVA (2010).
76. A recent significant addition to the literature comes with Coffee, supra note 9, at
337; see also Tiana Leia Russell, Exporting Class Actions to the European Union, 28 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 141, 177 (2010) (“Representative actions by associations also offer more
possibilities to curb principal-agent problems than do other forms of class actions.”); HansBernd Schaefer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class
Action and Legal Actions Taken by Associations, 9 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 183, 199–201 (2000)
(“[C]ompared to class action legal actions taken by associations seem to offer more effective
possibilities to restrict the principal-agent-problem . . . .”); Sarah A. Westby, Note,
Associations to the Rescue: Reviving the Consumer Class Action in the United States and
Italy, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 189 (2011) (“[A]ssociational
representation decreases agency costs because litigants can be confident that [the] entity has
their best interests in mind.”).
77. Economic theory predicts that the lack of profit incentives will make nonprofits
slower to expand to meet increased demand and less efficient at using inputs than for-profit
firms. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 844 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Mary Kay Gugerty & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and
Nonprofits: An Introduction to the Club Framework, in VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF NGOS
AND NONPROFITS: AN ACCOUNTABILITY CLUB FRAMEWORK 3, 8–13 (Mary K. Gugerty &
Aseem Prakash ed., 2010) (discussing sources of agency costs in nonprofit sector).
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beyond where their funders would accept.79 Even in the American public
interest context, the search for the perfect agents leads to claims of a
different kind of agency cost defined by the imposition of institutional
objectives over the interests of the putatively represented parties.80 At
bottom, there is simply no theoretical or empirical basis to suppose that the
absence of remuneration to an agent necessarily inures to the benefit of the
represented parties.81
Ironically, the very insight that opened the class action to a more
sophisticated scholarly account of agency costs may also now serve as a set
of blinders on the range of agency problems in representation. The
approach to agency cost suggested by Coffee drew (and still draws)
exclusively from the securities and corporate governance literature,82
inviting a comparison of the extent to which the governance mechanisms
chosen in the private domain could help overcome principal-agent
problems. Perhaps this move was inevitable given the sheer weight of
securities class actions in the post-1966 world of mass litigation. If
securities fraud class actions, especially after Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,83 were
to serve as the primary vehicle of legal oversight of corporate governance—
pushing to the side shareholder derivative suits and other clumsier forms of
corporate litigation—then the transposition of the terms of corporate
governance to the securities class action would make perfect sense. And,
further, if robust capital markets increasingly set the standards for
measuring the propriety of actions by corporate managers and directors,
then the logic of that governance structure should presumably extend to the
regulatory enterprise of the securities class action.
For all the insights offered by the securities context of a large proportion
of class actions, however, the class action shares only partially the
governance problems of the modern corporation. It is not simply that
79. Debra C. Minkoff & Walter W. Powell, Nonprofit Mission:
Constancy,
Responsiveness, or Deflection?, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 591,
592–93 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2006).
80. The classic account comes from Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:
Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J.
470, 505–11 (1976) (arguing for courts to be sensitive to disagreements in black
communities over the type of school relief). For efforts to mediate conflicts in public
interest representation, see William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing
Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J.
1623 (1997).
81. In the class context, several commentators have noted that a public interest
motivation may not always line up with maximizing the recovery for the class members (or
other class interests). See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action
Litigation: An Inquiry into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 618;
Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2090–91 (2004).
82. It is striking, for example that Coffee’s Litigation Governance, supra note 9, does
not even mention the social welfare concerns of public choice theory in the public sector.
By and large, the legal literatures on agency problems in the public sector and in private
corporate governance developed largely in splendid isolation from each other, despite the
overlapping set of concerns. This point is elaborated in Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 38,
at 643.
83. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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markets in securities bring the shareholders together and, at the same time,
offer them a chance of exit through the sale of securities. Rather, it is the
persistent role of the court as a state actor operating throughout the period
of existence of the class action that separates it from the business firm. The
role of the state in licensing and overseeing invites a comparison to a
different sort of principal-agent concern: the public choice account of
regulatory capture.
B. Public Choice in the Public Domain
Agency costs abound in any system of representation. The inevitable
mismatch between the incentive systems operating on the principals and
their agents gives rise to all sorts of opportunistic behavior by agents
seeking to exploit the dependence of the principals. Agency costs are
particularly acute where the principal is diffuse and unable to monitor
meaningfully the actions of the agents. In the key formulation of public
choice theory, such agency costs are likely to be most acute in the public
sector where the beneficiaries of obscure regulation can lobby and prevail
over the indifference of the mass of the cost-bearing public.84 In particular,
the absence of a market in representation (unlike the markets that always
operate in the background of private investment matters) means that there is
no ultimate competitive discipline on public sector decision making,
particularly in the absence of private alternatives.
Certainly membership in a class of negative-value claimants yields a
rational indifference on the part of class members. The question, however,
is not whether there are risks of agency cost in the private class action
organized under American law. Of course there are. Rather, the question is
always, compared to what? It is odd to read the literature applying agency
cost theory to the class action ignore the broader concerns of the public
choice literature about the risks in the public domain. One reads with some
bemusement the conclusion of earnest European reformers who insist that
having government entities or NGOs perform the representation function
eliminates the principal-agent problem. In the romantic and naïve claims of
such reformers, having a monopoly on representation somehow protects
diffuse class members from any agency cost in representation. As
presented in critiques of American class actions, agency cost becomes a
matter exclusive to the domain of private actors.
A quick tour of public choice theory should dispel such naïve claims.
Large, diffuse groups tend to lose to concentrated self-interest and nowhere
more so than in the public domain—the world conventionally understood to
be populated with lobbyists, special interests, privileged access, and so

84. The classic formulation of public choice theory is found in JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 3–9 (1962); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21–33 (1991); MAXWELL L. STEARNS
& TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 42–89 (2009).
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forth.85 Such agency costs may be present even in the American litigation
context when public agencies take on enforcement authority on behalf of
affected groups of citizens, as Margaret Lemos well presents.86
Just as there are examples of American class actions gone awry and of
entrepreneurial lawyers crossing the bounds of what the law permits, so too
there are stories of successes in nonprofit or public agency representation.87
It would be foolish to claim that there is an exclusive model of
representation that best fits all claims by groups who do not or cannot bind
their fates together through voluntary contracts. Perhaps the most
interesting of the successes of foreign efforts were the use of NGOs to curb
rampant corporate fraud during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), a Korean
nonprofit founded in 1994, successfully brought shareholder derivative suits
over corporate malfeasance on behalf of minority shareholders, in effect
bundling claims to overcome the inability of small shareholders to
challenge corporate actions.88 Similarly, in 1998, the Taiwanese Securities
and Futures Commission created a nonprofit, the Securities and Futures
85. For a particularly compelling case study, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at
the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 83 (1989).
86. Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by
State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012). The use of parens patriae authority
to bring claims by the state on behalf of affected citizens does not obviate concerns of
conflicts in representation. Attorneys general have a duty to the public at large, whose
interests may conflict with the interests of the individuals represented in litigation.
Attorneys general may also be motivated by their own political ambitions. Furthermore, the
individuals represented in litigation have no power to fire their representative beyond their
power as voters in general elections. See generally Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from
the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State
Attorneys General, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 361, 382 (1999) (discussing limited compensation
in AG actions); Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer Claims: Lessons from
the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 139 (1999) (discussing the risk of capture of
exclusive public representatives); William H. Pryor Jr., A Comparison of Abuses and
Reforms of Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1885, 1909–11
(2000) (critiquing the AG tobacco settlements). But see Edward Brunet, Improving Class
Action Efficiency by Expanded Use of Parens Patriae Suits and Intervention, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1919, 1932–33 (2000) (suggesting that the media plays an important role in the
accountability of public agency litigation).
87. Coffee elsewhere attends to some of the recent and unfortunate high-profile
prosecutions and incarcerations of leading class action lawyers to drive home the point about
high agency costs in private representation. John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and
Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better Than “Voice,”
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 411–12 (2008) (discussing the prosecution of four senior partners
at Milberg Weiss). One could be churlish (and yet still correct) to point out that whatever
the legal difficulties of some members of the private bar, they pale before the propensity of
governors of Illinois to end up in prison. See, e.g., Roxanne Roberts & Amy Argetsinger,
What's the Matter with Illinois? With Blagojevich Conviction, State Has Most Imprisoned
Governors, WASH. POST, (June 28, 2011, 7:22 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
reliable-source/post/whats-the-matter-with-illinois-with-blagojevich-conviction-state-hasmost-imprisoned-governors/2011/06/28/AGZVjnpH_blog.html.
88. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations As Investor Protection: Economic
Theory and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 169, 187 (2004) (recounting the
5 percent ownership threshold for prior legal actions).
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Institute (SFI), to coordinate individual investors in claims against public
companies.89 SFI was created as a nonprofit funded by mandatory
payments from banks and brokerage firms, which in turn allowed it to
acquire 1,000 shares of each public company in Taiwan, giving it standing
to assert claims as a shareholder.90
The experience of the PSPD in Korea and the SFI in Taiwan show the
impact of strongly led nonprofits offering an independent challenge to
institutional misconduct. Their successes are all the more striking given the
propensity of public enforcers to not have the resources or the will to
confront such malfeasance. But there is also a cautionary note even here.
These nonprofits tend not to last or to be unable to create an institutional
culture that goes beyond the commitment and charisma of its founding
leaders. The PSPD’s trailblazing in South Korea faded within five years
and, once the ownership threshold for initiating legal action was reduced,
independent shareholder actions began to emerge and the PSPD passed
from the center stage of reform activity.91
More typically, however, recent efforts to form class actions without
private financial incentives have faltered precisely because of the absence
of entrepreneurial initiative. For example, Brazil limits class action
formation to government agencies and “private associations,” which alone
have standing to serve as class counsel—and even here, the Attorney
General must be notified and invited to intervene as “overseer.”92 Despite
the ease of forming such associations, the fact that they must exist for one
year prior to any legal action means they are unable to form in response to a
single precipitating event. As a result, relatively few class actions have
been filed,93 and most concern professional associations suing on behalf of
the direct interests of their members.94 The experience is similar in
Portugal, home of the “popular action,” Europe’s oldest opt-out class action
89. Yu-Hsin Lin, Note, Modeling Securities Class Actions Outside the United States:
The Role of Nonprofits in the Case of Taiwan, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 143, 167–68 (2007).
90. Milhaupt, supra note 88, at 177.
91. Patricia Goedde, From Dissidents to Institution-Builders: The Transformation of
Public Interest Lawyers in South Korea, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 63, 85–86 (2009). In Japan, a
change in the threshold for filing suit gave rise to a shareholder institution not organized as a
nonprofit, but playing the same initial role as the PSPD in Korea and the SFI in Taiwan.
Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351,
369 (2001) (discussing the history of Shareholder Ombudsman (Kabunushi Onbuzuman));
see also Milhaupt, supra note 88, at 178–81 (same).
92. Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J.
COMP. L. 311, 339, 366 (2003).
93. See generally Larissa Clare Pochmann da Silva, Recent Developments in Collective
Process
and
Mechanisms
for
Solving
Collective
Conflicts
in
Brazil,
CLASSACTIONBLAWG.COM (Aug. 13, 2012), http://classactionblawg.com/2012/08/13/guestarticle-recent-developments-in-collective-process-and-mechanisms-for-solving-collectiveconflicts-in-brazil/.
94. See, e.g., Ángel R. Oquendo, Upping the Ante: Collective Litigation in Latin
America, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 248, 264–66 (2009) (discussing class action suits by
Brazilian Federation of Syndicates and Associations of Maintenance and Conservation
Companies and the Association of Judges of Rio Grande do Sul).
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regime, established in 1995.95 Portuguese law allows individuals and
associations to file class actions to protect numerous interests, and the
largest of these, the Portuguese Association for Consumer Protection
(DECO) was founded in 1974 and currently has about 400,000 members, at
least nominally.96 Between 1995 and 2008, DECO brought a grand total of
five damages class actions, of which the only one tried to judgment
involved an opera company.97
The list of the very limited enforcement successes of the public or NGO
model of the class actions could go on98 and could be expanded into efforts
to police capital markets as well—as with the German Capital Markets Case
Act, a largely useless attempt to create representative litigation without
class actions or class lawyers.99 The current debates over the expansion of
class actions, particularly in Latin American countries seeking to break the
excesses of state authority, are not about the costs of self-motivated
lawyers. They are instead about the ability to unleash independent agents
who will challenge the suffocating potential for capture of exclusive state
authority. As well expressed by Ricardo Lorenzetti, the President of the
Argentine Supreme Court, independent collective actions are critical
“because they are mechanisms that the rule of law provides so that civil
society participates,” and they allow the possibility of “fewer centralized
decisions in a country with a long tradition of centralized
decisionmaking.”100

95. RACHEL MULHERON, REFORM OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A
PERSPECTIVE OF NEED 97 (2008), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2F
Documents%2FCJC%2FPublications%2FOther+papers%2Freform-of-collective-redress
.pdf; HENRIQUE SOUSA ANTUNES, CLASS ACTIONS, GROUP LITIGATION & OTHER FORMS OF
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION (PORTUGUESE REPORT) 8, available at http://globalclassactions.
stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Portugal_National_Report.pdf.
96. Quem Somos, DECO, Membership information is from http://www.deco.
proteste.pt/informacao/associacao (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (listing membership).
97. CIVIC CONSULTING, COUNTRY REPORT PORTUGAL 10 (2008), available at http://ec.
europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/pt-country-report-final.pdf. (collecting cases).
98. Coffee’s examples regarding the use of class actions in Europe should introduce
somber reflection about the likely prospects of class actions serving any regulatory role in
Europe whatsoever. For example, the entire litigation history of the Swedish class action
opt-in model, heralded as the most advanced in Europe, generated a total of nine cases in the
first five years of practice, all of which would have been considered small stakes, small
impact cases in the United States. Coffee, supra note 9, at 330–32. There is, of course, no
requirement that any country provide class remedies, or even opt for nonpublic enforcement
of its laws. It is quite another matter to posit that this experience shows the potential for
nonentrepreneurial class actions to fill the regulatory gap that would ensue.
99. For a discussion, see Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 75, at 182–83.
100. Ricardo Lorenzetti, La Acción de Clase Es un Aporte al Diseño Institucional del
País, PORTAL DEL CONSUMIDOR PROTECTORA, http://www.protectora.org.ar/legislacion/laaccion-de-clase-es-un-aporte-al-diseno-institucional-del-pais/1453/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2012) (“Las acciones colectivas son un gran aporte al diseño institucional del país porque
son mecanismos que provee el Estado de Derecho para que la sociedad civil participe. Y si el
ciudadano común participa en la vida del país, entonces hay más control, más debate, hay
discusión y transparencia, menos oscilaciones pendulares y más equilibrio de fuerzas, menos
decisiones centralizadas en un país con una larga tradición de decisiones centralizadas.”).
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A recent analysis of class actions in Chile contains well-researched
documentation of class acitons without entrepreneurial leadership. In 2004,
the Chilean legislature sought to create American style opt-out consumer
class actions, but without the creation of an entrepreneurial plaintiffs’
bar.101 Notably, the Chilean act provided that class counsel is assigned
after the class certification stage, meaning that attorneys who ferret out
wrongdoing stand to lose control of the class to a rival attorney representing
a small number of class members, or to the state consumer protection
agency SERNAC, which must approve all settlements and has the option to
assume control of any litigation.102 Combined with the limited range of
damages, this means that there is little incentive for attorneys to serve the
role of private attorneys general. The result was predictably marginal, at
best. Few class actions are ever filed in Chile; the peak was eleven in 2007,
and by 2010, only four were filed.103 SERNAC and independent consumer
associations are the most frequent class action plaintiffs, but chronic
funding shortages prevent them from pursuing more than a handful of cases
at a time—cases that frequently drag out for years due to the lack of
settlement pressure.104 Class actions financed by small, cohesive groups of
plaintiffs or by entrepreneurial lawyers are few in number, and the low
financial stakes mean that class counsel is often relatively
unsophisticated.105
To return to the main thesis of this Article, at the end of the day, agency
costs result from the fact of needing agents. If our only objective is to
avoid the risk of the car mechanic recommending needless repairs or the
dentist overtreating then the easiest solution is to never take our cars to the
shop and never enter the dentist’s office. We would thereby successfully
avoid overpaying, though a world of disabled cars and abscessed mouths
awaits.
It is easy to focus on the perceived excesses of American class actions.
There are no doubt embarrassing cases brought in the zeal for gain, and the
lawyers do receive on the order of 25 percent of the proceeds.106 Both the
amount charged and the possible excesses are a form of agency cost that
requires both justification and regulation. Less visible, but perhaps more
pervasive and damaging, are the agency costs foregone because of a lack of
agents who will undertake the work of principals unable to undertake the
work themselves. The short run gain of avoiding the mechanic and the
dentist is rarely the winning strategy in the long run. Perhaps, in some
101. Agustin Barroilhet, Class Actions in Chile 1 (Jan. 30, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1995906.
102. Id. at 8, 12–13.
103. Id. at 20–21 & fig.1.
104. See id. at 28–33.
105. See id. at 42–43.
106. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004); Brian T.
Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards,
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 833 (2010).
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alternative set of arrangements, all such considerations could be avoided in
nonprofit garages and dental cooperatives. Perhaps.
CONCLUSION
It is inevitable in life that we have to rely on others for what we cannot
do ourselves. With agency comes costs, a condition that may be managed
but never cured. In the public domain, we look to elements of political
accountability to justify the ability of some to bind others by their actions.
In the private domain, the best indication of fairness comes with the
revealed preferences of private exchange. As society becomes more
complex, the simpler solutions of town meetings in the public domain and
one-to-one contracts in the private domain become unwieldy, and a host of
intermediary institutional arrangement needs to be created.
Class actions are the product of complex interactions, and they fall
neither fully within nor without the domain of public regulation or private
contractual exchange. As with all such intermediary organizations, there
needs to be justification for the powers of the governors and for the costs
that they will inevitably exact for their governance. The ultimate difficulty
is that the justification for the class action ultimately lies neither in the
domain of the democratic legitimacy that we may attach to the state nor to
the voluntarism that we assign to contracts. Class actions fall somewhere in
between and the justifications, largely functional, are cobbled together from
a host of considerations, some from the public domain and some from the
private domain.
Ever since Hansberry v. Lee,107 the Supreme Court has recognized that
class representatives may not faithfully represent the interests of the absent
class members.108 The result has been the increasing formalism in class
action law focusing on the requirements for certification and, in particular,
on the adequacy of representation. In recent decisions such as Taylor v.
Sturgell109 and Smith v. Bayer,110 the Court has demanded that the
formalities of class certification be honored before any claims of agents to
bind their principals might be recognized.111 Taken together, these cases
signal the Court’s tacit recognition that rights of representation are being
assigned without many of the safeguards that are usually demanded in
granting legitimacy to governmental authority. Although the governance
issue in the case law usually plays out as a formal exercise in following
Rule 23, there is more at stake. The Court’s leading cases stand for the
recognition that attentiveness to procedural rigor is the price paid for
collective action in the absence of normal political accountability.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

311 U.S. 32 (1940).
Id. at 43–44.
553 U.S. 880 (2008).
131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
See id. at 2380–81; Taylor, 553 U.S. at 884–85.

